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Abstract 
This paper investigates empirically whether a bank lending channel of monetary policy existed in Japan from 2000 to 
2012. We extend Bernanke and Blinder’s model and estimate it with the Bayesian method to deal with the identification 
problem. In particular, we focus on the differential effects of quantitative easing monetary policy regardless of bank size 
(City banks vs. Regional banks) and firm size (all enterprises vs. small and medium-sized enterprises). We find that the 
semi-elasticities of loan supply with respect to bank lending rate are larger than those of loan demand, implying a need 
for larger decline in bank lending rate to stimulate loan demand following an increase in loan supply. We also find that 
the semi-elasticities of both loan demand and loan supply are almost the same with respect to bank lending rate 
regardless of bank and enterprise size. Bayesian impulse response function analyses show an increase in bank lending 
but a decline in spread following quantitative easing monetary policy shock, which is evidence of the bank lending 
channel. Variance decomposition analyses show that while a large proportion of forecast error variance in bank loans is 
explained by monetary policy shock, a large proportion of forecast error variance in spread is explained by loan supply 
shocks. These results also comprise evidence of bank lending channel. However, we find no evidence that loans of 
smaller banks and loans to smaller firms are more sensitive to monetary policy.  
Keywords: monetary policy, bank lending channel, Bayesian estimation, Japan 
1. Introduction 
Since the leading work of Bernanke and Blinder (1988), many studies have examined the role of banks in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism. Banks play two key roles in the transmission. One is the money role, or the interest rate 
channel, by which banks act on the liability side; that is, they create money by issuing deposits. The other is the credit 
role, or the bank lending channel, by which they act on the assets side.  
According to Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap and Stein (1994), and Benanke and Gertler (1995), the bank 
lending channel stems from credit market imperfections, mainly asymmetric information. In case of information 
asymmetries, monetary policy has a direct effect on the external finance premium, which becomes a ―wedge‖ in costs 
between funds raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and the funds generated internally (by retaining earnings). 
For example, following contractionary monetary policy, banks’ reserves decrease, and, because their ability to issue 
deposits is constrained following the reserve requirements, their deposits also decrease. If the banks cannot insulate 
their lending activities from changes in reserves by either switching from deposits to other forms of finance such as CDs, 
CPs, and equity or by adjusting their net holdings of bonds, they would have to reduce their supply of bank loans. On 
the other hand, if some firms are bank-dependent and therefore cannot offset the decline in bank loan supply by 
switching their form of external finance by issuing corporate bonds or equities, their investment would fall and, hence, 
the aggregate demand would fall. (Note 1) 
A conventional Investment Saving–Liquidity Preference Money Supply (IS-LM) model has two financial assets, money 
and bonds. Since money is assumed to pay a zero nominal interest rate, the determined nominal interest rate is 
interpreted as returns on bonds. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) introduce the loan market into the IS-LM framework by 
distinguishing between money, bonds, and bank loans. They assume that (i) deposits and other sources of finance are 
not perfect substitutes for banks, so that banks are unable to insulate their loan supply from the decline in bank reserves 
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induced by monetary policy; (ii) bank loans and other sources of finance are not perfect substitutes for firms, so that 
firms are unable to insulate their investments from a decline in bank loan supply; and (iii) aggregate demand depends on 
both bank lending rate and bond rate. The prominent feature of the model is that the modified IS curve, derived by 
combining the commodity market clearing condition and the credit market clearing condition and thus called ―the CC 
curve,‖ depends on the volume of reserves. Thus, a change in reserves following monetary policy affects not only the 
LM curve but also the modified IS curve. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate empirically whether the bank lending channel operated in Japan. Following 
the burst of the asset price bubbles in the early 1990s, the Japanese economy went into a long economic slump. The 
failure of large financial institutions in autumn 1997 forced the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to lower the overnight call rate to 
0.02% in February 1999. The period from 1999 to 2000 is called the ―zero interest rate period‖ in Japan, and the BOJ no 
longer had room for further decline in the nominal interest rate. In March 2002, the BOJ decided to adopt a new 
framework, under which it could control its outstanding current account balances as the main operating instrument, and 
it raised the target level of the current account balance. (Note 2) However, as Krugman (1998a, 1998b) argued, Japan 
might have been in a liquidity trap in which the semi-elasticity of money demand to interest rate becomes so high that 
the quantitative easing monetary policy is ineffective in lowering the interest rates and stimulating the economy. 
However, note that this argument is based on the conventional IS-LM framework wherein the quantitative easing 
monetary policy could affect only the LM curve. On the other hand, if the bank lending channel can operate in Japan, 
the quantitative easing monetary policy can have some positive effect on the output. Therefore, to assess the BOJ’s 
quantitative easing monetary policy, we need to investigate whether the bank lending channel existed in Japan.  
In this paper, we follow Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and propose a simple model with a bank lending channel. We then 
estimate the model using the Bayesian method to investigate whether the bank lending channel existed in Japan. We 
know that empirical analysis based on aggregate data suffer from an important identification problem: the inability to 
distinguish the change in bank loan observed after monetary policy is attributed to a change in loan supply (bank 
lending channel) or to a change in demand for bank loans stemming from a change in investments. The Bayesian 
estimation method allows us to distinguish the structural shocks that enable us to deal with the identification problem. 
Moreover, we focus on the differential quantitative easing monetary policy effects regardless of bank and firm size. This 
is motivated by Kashyap and Stein’s (1994) finding that since the existence of bank lending channels depends on the 
assumption of credit market imperfections from mainly information asymmetries, the loans of smaller banks and loans 
to bank-dependent smaller firms are more sensitive to monetary policy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the related literature that empirically 
investigates the bank lending channel in the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Section 3 proposes a simple 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, in line with Bernanke and Blinder (1988), and considers the 
bank lending channel. Section 4 estimates the model using the Bayesian estimation method, and Section 5 concludes the 
study.  
2. Literature Review 
A vast body of the literature has investigated the bank lending channel of monetary policy empirically. Table 1 
summarizes the related literature. 
A large number of the early empirical works using aggregate data depend on vector autoregressive (VAR)-type models. 
They study the role of banks in the monetary policy transmission mechanism by investigating how bank loans respond 
to changes in monetary policy instruments or by examining the predictive power of bank loans for real economic 
variables. These studies include Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Ueda (1993), Dale and Halden (1993) and Walsh and 
Wilcox (1995). However, studies based on reduced-form VAR models suffer from an identification problem: the 
inability to distinguish between the change in bank loans following a monetary-policy induced change in loan supply 
(bank lending channel) and the change in demand for bank loans following a change in investments (interest rate 
channel).  
There are mainly four approaches to deal with this identification problem. 
The first employs a structural VAR (SVAR) model to distinguish between structural shocks, including loan supply 
shocks and loan demand shocks. Fackler (1990), Fackler and Rogers (1993), and Holtemöller (2003) are studies 
classified under this approach. 
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Table 1. Literature review 
 
countries estimation methods
sample periods / frequaency (prominent features)
USA money demand function：m  on m -1, i ,p ,y
1974Q1-1985Q4 / quarterly loan demand function：l  on l -1,ρ ,i ,p ,y
USA "St.Loius equation"
⊿y  on lagged ⊿y , lagged⊿m , dummy
⊿y  on lagged⊿y , lagged⊿l , dummy
USA
1960Q1-1984Q4 / quarterly
USA
1959M7-1989M12 / monthly
USA SVAR
1973Q2-1989Q1 / quarterly (considering exchage rate channel)
USA
1975Q1-1991Q4 / quarterly
USA Three types of investment functions
1963Q1-1989Q4 / quarterly VAR
USA
1954M1-1991M12 / monthly
Japan
1969M1-1989M10 / monthly
UK VAR
1974M6-1992M10 / monthly
(considering personal and company
sectors separately)
USA VAR
1960Q1-1991Q4 / quarterly (considering firm size)
USA event study monetary contraction→spread(ρ -i ), mix
1890-1991 OLS y (industrial production) on  l
USA OLS
1973Q4-1991Q2 / quarterly (considering firm size)
USA (New England9 OLS，2SLS
1989Q2-1994Q4 / quarterly
(considering regulatory policy on the
banking sector)
USA OLS
1962Q2-1992Q4 / quarterly (considering firm size)
USA
1959M1-1994M12 / monthly
Netherlands
1979Q1-1993Q4 / quarterly
Germany
1975M1-1998M12 / monthly
Italy
1984M1-1998M12 / monthly
Germany
1975Q1-1998Q4 / quarterly
Japan SVAR
1965M1-1999M6 / monthly (considering bank and firm size)
USA, Gernamy, Japan, France, UK, Italy VECM
1977Q1-1999Q4(-1998Q4 for Germany, France and
Italy) / quarterly
(comparing 6 countries)
SVAR
The federal and private components of total credit
individually have important but different effects on
economic activity
real military spending, mb, m, p, i, y, federal and
private components of total nonfinancial domestic
debt
Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993)
"mix", spread (CP rate - TB rate), investment and
inventory variables, business cycle indicator
Fackler and Rogers (1993)
Small and large firms bank debt behaves little differently
from nonbank debt after monetary policy shock. There is
no evidence that contractionary monetary policy limits the
supply of bank debt relative to other forms of finance
⊿l  on lagged i，lagged equity capital
Investment function: Investment on lagged
Investment, lagged net sales, lagged cost of capital,
cash flow-1,
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996)
For small firms,  external finance becomes scarce and then
linkage between internal funds and investment tightens
significantly after contractionary monetary policy.
author variables findings
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) instrumental variables (IV) 
Money demand shocks became much more important
relative to credit demand shocks in the 1980's.
Shifts in monetary policy alters the mix of loans and CP,
and the induced shifts in this mix affects investment.
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) VAR
Romer and Romer (1990) OLS,2SLS,IV
Examing the dates of shifts to anti-inflationary policy
（Romer dates）. The forecast errors of credit supply is
smaller than that of money supply, which implies that
monetary policy inflences over the economy through
money channel rather than through credit channel.
1941M1-1984M12 / monthly
Fackler (1990)
government expenditures，p，ex，m，total
nonfinancial domestic debt，y,  i
Credit is at least as important as any other variable in
explaining movements in output, prices and interest rate.
Movements in exchange rate have significant effects on
domestic credit. These rusults supprts the creit  view and
indicates the importance of the international features of the
model.
Dale and Halden (1994)
Bank behavior plays important role in monetary policy
transmission mechanism, but the importance of banks
varies across sectors
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
Following contractionary monetary policy, small firms
contract substantially relative to large firms and they
account for a significantly disproportionate amount of the
ensuing decline in manufacturing.
Miron, Romer and Weil (1994)
The evidence of the systematic changes in the importance
of the lending channel cannot be found given the changes in
financial structure.
y  (industrial production),retail sales,l, d, ex, stock
price
sales, inventories, short-tem debt
Kakes (2000) VECM
ρ , long-term interest rate,  y , bank's bond holdings,
l
Banks use bonds as a buffer stock to offset exogenous
disturbenace, thus bank lending is not an important
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Holtemöller (2003) SVAR
world export price, y (industrial production),  p, i,
spread(ρ-i ), l, real effective exchange rate
The impact of monetary policy on output can be
explained cinsiderable extent by credit channel.
Contractionary monetary policy increases the loan spread
(external finance premium)
There exists long-run loan demand and loan supply, which
is the evidence in support of the bank lending channel.
Although monetary policy induced changes in loan supply
are significant, but they are small in magnitude.
Chiades and Gambacorta (2004) SVECM
The impact of monetary policy on output and prices is
significant through the money and credit channels, while
exchange rate puzzle is detected.
SVECM
y (industrial production)）, p, i, ex, spread(ρ -i ),
wage index, p* (Germany)，i *(Germany)，worl
price commodity index
mix（three types）　on lagged mix, monetary policy indicatorOliner and Rudebusch (1995)
Ford, Agung, Ahmed and Santoso (2003)
i,  stock index, bank's balance sheet varables (d ,
securities, l), y (industrial production), p
The contractionary monetary policy influences more
substantially small banks and small bisunesses, groups
that are more severely affected by capital market
imperfections.
Brissmis and Magginas (2005) y , p , l , d , spread (ρ -i )
In the USA and UK, the lending channel is not a part of
the transmission mechanism, while it plays a significant
role in japan. The other three European are in between.
Changes in financial structures matter for monetary policy
transmission.
Hülsewig, Winker and Worms (2004)
l , bank's equity, y , π, i ( bond rate, money market
rate)
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)
VAR
（considering firm size）
Among various monetary variables, bank loan is the best
predictor of real economic variables, which means that
bank loans play an important role in the transmission of
monetary policy
mb，m (M1，M2），l，y  ,p，i
Walsh and Wilcox (1995) VAR y ,⊿p, FF rate, prime rate, l
Shocks to loan supply are sometimes important
determinants of the volume of bank loan outstanding and
of aggregate output.
Peek and Rosengren (1995)
Monetary policy effects through capital- unconstrained
banks have a stronger effect on the economy compared to
the effects through capital-constrained banks
y，π，i,  financial variable（total loans, business
loans, total securities, real estate loans, large time
deposits, consumer loan, N.E.C. bank loans, CP,
tradable payables, tradable recievable)
Following contractionary monetary policy, lending to
small firms declines relative to lending to large firms, and
short term borrowing by large firms from both banks and
nonbank sources rise substantially.
Ueda(1993) VAR
p,ln (M1), ln (M2),i（FF rate,TB rate, bond rate),
nonborrowed reserves of depository institutions
Nominal interest rates, particulary FF rate, are good
forcasts of real variables. Monetary policy works in part
by affecting the composition of bank assets.
Ramey (1993) VECM
y( industrial production), ln (M1)，ln (M2)，l，
inventory，p，i(FF rate,TB rate, CP rate),
monetary policy index(Boshen and Mill(1992))
The predivtive power of M2 for output is stronger than
that of bank loan, which suggests that the money channel
is much more important than the credit channel.
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Notes: y: output; p: price index; i: short-term nominal interest rate; ρ: bank lending rate; mb: monetary base; m: money 
supply; l: bank loans; d: deposit; ex: nominal exchange rate. 
The second approach employs cointegration methods, or the vector error correction model (VECM). As mentioned 
earlier, three conditions must be satisfied for a bank lending channel to exist: (i) bank loans must be imperfect 
substitutes for other sources of finance, (ii) no perfect substitutes must exist for other sources of bank portfolios, and (iii) 
the aggregate loan demand must depend on the bank lending rate. Therefore, this approach investigates the stable 
long-run relationships between (i) loan demand and bank lending rate in the loan demand function, (ii) loan supply and 
bank lending rate in the loan supply function, and (iii) the aggregate demand and bank lending rate in the aggregate 
demand function. Examples of this approach include Kakes (2000), Chiades and Gambacorta (2004), Hülsewig, Winker, 
and Worms (2004), and Brissimis and Magginas (2005). 
The third approach focuses on the relative movements of bank loans and a substitute for bank loans, commercial papers 
(CPs). The central insight is that they should contain information about the loan demand. Following a contractionary 
monetary policy, for example, if bank loans decrease due to a decline in loan supply, firms will increase their issuance 
of CPs. On the other hand, if a decline in loan demand is the main reason for the decrease in bank loans, the issuance of 
CPs also would decrease. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) use the ―mix‖ variables, defined as ratio of bank loans to 
the sum of bank loans and CPs, for analysis. They investigate whether the mix variables would decrease significantly 
following a contractionary monetary policy and examine the predictive power of the mix variables for real economic 
variables. Miron, Romer, and Weil (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) are also classified under this approach. 
The fourth approach uses disaggregate rather than aggregate data and examines the differential effects of monetary 
policy regardless of bank and firm size. As for bank size, Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) show that small-bank lending 
falls substantially compared to large-bank lending following a tight monetary policy, and show that the bank lending 
channel matters more for the lending of small banks with the least liquid balance sheets. These results cannot be 
explained using the traditional interest rate channel. As for firm size, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) find that small 
firms contract substantial sales and short-term debts (bank loans and CPs) relative to large firms after a contractionary 
monetary policy. These asymmetric responses between small and large firms cannot be explained using the traditional 
interest rate channel. Thus, the credit channel has larger effects on small firms that depend on banks and have higher 
agency costs, indicating that credit market imperfections help propagate the impact of monetary policy. Studies based 
on this approach include Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, 1996), Peek and Rosengren (1995), and Ford Agung, Ahmed, 
and Santoso (2003). In recent years, some approaches use micro-data (individual bank data or firm data); for example, 
Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martínez-Pagés, Sevestre, and Worms (2003). 
This paper presents another empirical approach to deal with the identification problem, the Bayesian estimation method. 
This system-based method estimates each equation simultaneously and allows us to identify each structural shock, 
including the loan supply and loan demand shocks. The SVAR approach also can estimate each equation simultaneously 
and identify each structural shock. However, since the SVAR is based on a non-linear estimation method, implausible 
parameter values are often estimated, depending on their initial values. On the other hand, the Bayesian method can 
incorporate additional parameter information through priors and hence can offer economically meaningful parameters. 
3. Model 
In this section, we follow Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and propose a simple model that uses the bank lending channel.  
As in Bernanke and Blinder (1988), we assume three assets, money, bonds, and bank loans. Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) focus on how monetary policy affects the aggregate demand, and so they ignore the supply side and treat the 
price level as given. We deviate from Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and endogenize the price level (inflation rate) by 
adding the aggregate supply curve (the Phillips curve) to their model. Hereafter, the lowercase letter denotes the 
percentage deviation from its steady-state value, except for interest rate.  
We describe the loan market by the following equations: 
 1 2 , 1 2, , 0
d
t t t t ld tl p a y a a a       (1) 
 1 , 1( ) , 0
s
t t t t ls tl b i d b       (2) 
where dl  and sl  denote the loan demand and loan supply, respectively; y  is the real output; p  is the price level; 
  and i  are the bank lending rate and bond rate, respectively; and d  denotes deposits. Equation (1) is a loan 
demand function, by which the real loan demand is increasing in economic activity but decreasing in bank lending rate. 
Loan demand will not depend on the bond rate if the firms are bank-dependent, that is, if they cannot issue corporate 
bonds to finance their expenditure. Equation (2) is a loan supply function, by which the fraction of the bank’s net of 
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required reserves held in bank loans is increasing in the interest rate spread i  . (Note 3) ld  and ls  are exogenous 
shocks to loan demand and loan supply, respectively. 
Since the bank’s reserve demand equals its reserve supply determined by the central bank in equilibrium, the 
equilibrium reserves condition can be written as  
 1 1 1, 0
s
t t trs c i d b c     , (3) 
where the left-hand side of equation (3) ( srs ) is the reserve supply and the right-hand side indicates that the reserve 
demand is decreasing in bond rate. (Note 4) 
By inserting equation (3) into (2) and eliminating d , we obtain the loan supply function, represented in terms of the 
reserve supply rs  as follows: 
 1 1 1 ,( )
s s
t t t t ls tl b b c i rs       (4) 
We find that the assumption of 1 1b c  ensures that the loan supply is decreasing in the bond rate, i . 
The money market clearing condition can be described by a traditional LM curve， 
 1 2 , 1 2, , 0t t t t dd td p d y d i d d     . (5) 
The demand for deposits (i.e., money) is increasing in real income y  and decreasing in the opportunity cost of holding 
deposits i . (Note 5) dd  is the exogenous shock to deposit (money) demand. By inserting equation (3) into (5) and 
eliminating d , we obtain the LM curve, represented in terms of the reserve supply rs  as follows: 
 1 1 2 ,( )t t t t dd trs p d y c d i      . (6) 
We specify the IS curve as 
    1 1 2 1 3 1 , 1 2 3( [ ] ) ( [ ] ) , , , 0t t t t t t t t t t y ty e y e i E p p e E p p e e e            , (7) 
which indicates that the aggregate demand depends negatively on the real interest rate measured by the bond rate as 
well as bank lending rate. We also include the aggregate demand lag term 1y  to capture the habit formation in 
consumption and the adjustment costs in investment. y  denotes the demand shock. 
The Phillips curve (the aggregate supply curve) is specified as  
 1 1 2 , 1 2, , 0t t t tg g y g g      . (8) 
We include a lag term 1  to capture inflation persistence, that is, the dependence of inflation on its own past.   
denotes cost-push shock. The specification in equation (8) is based on Galí and Gertler (1999) and Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) that point out that the existence of backward-looking firms, which use a simple 
rule-of-thumb or an indexation when setting their prices, creates inflation persistence. 
By plugging the loan market clearing condition [combining equations (1) and (4) into (7)] so as to eliminate  , we 
obtain 
 
2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 32 1 1
1 1
2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3
3 , , 2 1 ,2 1 2 2 1 3 3
2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
[ ]
( ) ( )( ) (1 )
t t t t t
ls t ld t y ts
t t
a b e b c e a b e ea b e
y y i E p
a b a e a b a e a b a e
e a ba b e a b e e
p rs
a b a e a b a e a b a e
  
 
    
  
     
     
  
     
. (9) 
Equation (9) is the CC curve, which represents the combination of the real income and bond rate that equilibrate both 
commodities’ (goods）market and the credit market. Under the assumption of 1 1 0b c  ，the CC curve is downward 
sloping in the y i  plane, like the IS curve. As mentioned above, the prominent feature of the CC curve is that it 
depends on the quantity of reserves, rs . Therefore, a change in reserves induced by monetary policy affects not only 
the LM curve but also the CC curve. We also see from equation (9) that when the loan demand or supply are perfectly 
elastic with respect to bank lending rate ( 2, 1a b  ) or the bank lending rate does not affect the aggregate demand 
( 3 0e  ), there is no distinct bank lending channel. 
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Our model is closed after specifying the monetary policy rule. Suppose that the monetary policy operating instrument is 
the reserve supply (the outstanding current account balance at the BOJ), consistent with the fact that the BOJ has 
adopted the reserve supply as the main operating instrument since March 2001. Furthermore, suppose that the BOJ 
responds to the real income (output gap) and inflation.  
 1 2
s
t t t trs h y h v     (10) 
 1 1 , 1, 0 1t t rs tv k v k     (11) 
Equation (10) indicates that the BOJ decreases the reserve supply when the real output and/or inflation rate increases. 
Equation (11) indicates that the exogenous component v  follows the AR(1) process. rs  is the monetary policy 
shock.  
Summarizing the above, our model consists of seven equations, (1), (4), (6)–(8), (10), and (11), with seven endogenous 
variables, { , , , , , , }t t t t t t t tx y p rs i l  . 
 
4. Estimation 
4.1 Methodology  
We employ the Bayesian methodology to estimate our model. This is a system-based method that allows us to 
incorporate additional information on parameters through priors. This feature is very useful when only small samples of 
data are available, as in our model. The Bayesian estimation methodology consists of five steps. (Note 6) 
The first step solves the linear rational expectations model. In general, the log-linearized DSGE model can be written as 
a rational expectations system of the form, 
 0 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t tx x            , (12) 
where x  denotes the vector of endogenous variables,   is the vector of exogenous process  , 1[ ] 0t tE     denotes 
the rational expectation forecast errors, and   is the parameter vector. The solution algorithm for the linear 
rational-expectations model proposed by Sims（2002） is applied to equation (12) to obtain the state transition equation, 
 1 1 2( ) ( )t t tx x     . (13) 
At the second step, the model is written in state space form by adding the measurement equation to the state transition 
equation (13). The measurement equation relates the model variable x  to a vector of observables, z : 
 ( )t tz A Bx    (14) 
where ( )A   denotes the constant vector, which is related to the parameters, and B  denotes the matrix selecting the 
elements of model variables x , which are related to the observable variables. 
The third step is the likelihood function  L Z , where 1{ }
T
t tZ z   is evaluated with the Kalman filter. However, 
estimating parameter vector   using the maximum-likelihood method is not easy, because the likelihood function is 
specified as a complex multi-dimensional parameter function and might have twin or multiple peaks, or a flatter shape 
around its peak. 
Thus, at the fourth step, the likelihood function  L Z  and prior distribution ( )p   are combined to obtain the 
posterior density function  
    ( )p Z L Z p    . 
Now, a numerical optimization routine is used to maximize  ln ln ( )L Z p    to obtain the posterior mode of 
  ( )L Z p  , and the inverse of the Hessian of   ( )L Z p   evaluated at the posterior mode    , denoted by 
 , is calculated as  
 
1
2 ( )L Z p


   
   
 
 
. 
At the final step, the model derives the parameters’ posterior distribution numerically using a Monte Carlo Markov 
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Chain (MCMC) algorithm. The specific MCMC algorithm used in this paper is the Metoropolis-Hastings algorithm. In 
this algorithm, (0)  is drawn from the normal distribution 20( , )N c   as the starting value and   is drawn from 
the proposal distribution ( 1) 2( , )sN c   for 1, ,s n , where 0c   is the scale parameter, which adjusts the 
variance. The jump from ( 1)s  is accepted with probability 
 
 ( ) ( 1)
( )
min 1,
( )s s
L Z p
L Z p 
  
 
  
 
 
and rejected otherwise ( ( ) ( 1)s s  ). We know that the sequence of (1) (2) ( ){ , , , }n    converges to the true 
distribution   ( )L Z p   as n  . 
In this paper, we generate 100 000 draws in this manner, discarding the first 30000 iterations.  
4.2 Data and Priors 
Note that we need at least as many exogenous shocks as there are observed variables to avoid stochastic singularity in 
Bayesian estimation. Our model includes seven endogenous variables, { , , , , , , }t t t t t t t tx y p rs i l  , and six exogenous 
shocks, , , , , , ,{ , , , , , }t y t t dd t ld t ls t rs t       . Thus, we can use at most six observable variables. We choose the six 
observable variables { , , , , , }t t t t t t tz y p rs i l . 
Since the sample period should include the era of quantitative easing monetary policy, we set the period from January 
2000 to December 2012 using monthly data. 
Our model is represented in terms of percentage deviation from its steady-state value, except for the interest rate. 
Therefore, we log and de-trend the data of the real income (output gap) y , price index p , bank reserves rs , and 
bank lending l  using the Hodrick–Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter of 14400, and de-mean the data on 
bond rate i  and the bank lending rate  . We calculate the data on y  from the industrial production index and on 
  from the consumer price index. As mentioned above, we focus on the differential effects of quantitative easing 
monetary policy regardless of bank and enterprise size. We consider three categories of Japanese banks based on their 
size on the lending side: all banks, City banks, and Regional I and II banks (hereafter, Regional banks). (Note 7) We 
also consider two categories of enterprises based on their borrowing side: all enterprises (corporations), and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (hereafter SMEs). Thus, the data on bank lending are classified into six categories—(i) aal : 
all banks’ loans to all firms, (ii) asl : all banks’ loans to SMEs, (iii) cal : City banks’ loans to all enterprises, (iv) csl : 
City banks’ loans to SMEs, (v) ral : Regional banks’ loans to all firms, and (vi) rsl : Regional banks’ loans to SMEs. 
The data on bond rate i  comprise the 10-year government bond yield. As for data on bank lending rate, we categorize 
three types of data based on the average contract interest rate on loans according to the three categories of banks: the 
average contract interest rate on loans of all banks for (i) and (ii); that on loans of City banks for (iii) and (iv); and that 
on loans of Regional banks for (v) and (vi). Owing to limited data availability, we proxy the outstanding balance of the 
BOJ’s current accounts rs  as the deposit paid data on the assets side of the banks’ balance sheet. Similarly, we use the 
three types of data on the deposits paid in accordance with the three categories of banks: the deposit paid data of all 
banks for (i) and (ii); those of City banks for (iii) and (iv); and those of Regional banks for (v) and (vi). The above data 
can be obtained from the BOJ. 
The priors are specified in Table 2, which reports the distribution, the mean, and standard deviations. We use the 
gamma distribution for parameters restricted to be positive, and the inverse gamma distribution for the standard 
deviations of the shocks. As for the means of parameters, we choose standard values. 
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Table 2. Priors 
 
4.3 Results and Discussions 
Table 3 reports the Bayesian estimation results. As for the loan demand and supply curves, the estimated 
semi-elasticities of loan supply with respect to bank lending rate are larger than those of loan demand. This means that 
the loan supply curve is flatter in the l   plane, and, thus, following an increase in loan supply (the loan supply 
curve shifts to the right), a larger decline in bank lending rate is needed to stimulate loan demand. Furthermore, the 
semi-elasticities of both loan demand and loan supply with respect to bank lending rate are almost the same regardless 
of bank and enterprise size. (Note 8) As for the money demand function, the point estimation of semi-elasticities with 
respect to bond rate 1 2c d  is about 1.408, which is much larger than the estimation obtained in previous studies. This 
might show that Japan has been in a ―liquidity trap‖ in recent years. As for the IS curve, the aggregate demand reacts 
more to the real interest rate in terms of bank lending rate than in terms of bond rate, meaning that the bank lending rate 
plays an important role in determining the aggregate demand. As for the Phillips curve, the elasticities of inflation rate 
with respect to the output gap are estimated at small values of about 0.02. This means that a 1% improvement in output 
gap increases the inflation rate by only 0.02%. These findings are consistent with the fact that the Philipps curve has 
become ―flatter‖ in recent years. Last, the estimated monetary policy function indicates that the BOJ reacts more 
aggressively to changes in output gap than to changes in inflation rates. 
Figure 1 displays the Bayesian impulse response functions of output gap y， inflation rate  ，the spread i  , and 
bank lending l  with respect to the one-standard-error positive shock to bank reserves rs  for 24 periods (2 years). 
Table 4 extracts the figures for i   and bank lending l . From the figure and table, we find that the quantitative 
easing monetary policy shock l  increases while i   declines, and that y  and   increase significantly in all 
cases. The co-existence of the decline in i   and increase in l  means that the loan supply increases more than the 
loan demand, which is evidence of the bank lending channel. Moreover, a comparison of the bank loans to all 
enterprises with the loans to SMEs shows that the spreads decline more largely, while loans increase more slightly for 
loans to all enterprises. One possible explanation is that following the quantitative easing monetary policy shock, the 
loan demand curve of SMEs shifts to the right in larger magnitude. 
Table 5 shows the variance decomposition results, that is, the proportion of forecast error variance explained by each 
shock. We see that the shock that can explain the most proportion in forecast error variance of bank loan l  is the 
monetary policy shock rs . On the other hand, the shock that can explain the most proportion in forecast error variance 
of spread i   is the loan supply shock ls . These results are consistent with the impulse response functions and 
comprise evidence of the bank lending channel. A comparison of the results of loans to all enterprises with those of 
loans to SMEs also show that a larger proportion in the forecast error variance of bank loan l  is explained by loan 
supply shock ls  for loans to SMEs than for loans to all enterprises. These results indicate that the equilibrium 
 
distribution mean standard error
a 1 elasticity of loan demand with respect to real output Gamma 0.5 0.1
a 2 semi-elasticity of loan demand with respect to bank lending rate Gamma 0.02 0.004
b 1 semi-elasticity of loan supply with respect to spread Gamma 0.05 0.01
c 1 semi-elasticity of bank reserves demand  with respect to bond rate Gamma 0.01 0.002
d 1 elasticity of money demand with respect to real output Gamma 1.0 0.2
d 2 semi-elasticity of loan demand with respect to bond rate Gamma 0.5 0.1
e 1 degree of aggregate demand persistence Gamma 0.7 0.14
e 2
semi-elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to real interest rate
in terms of bond rate
Gamma 1.5 0.3
e 3
semi-elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to real interest rate
in terms of bank lending rate
Gamma 1.0 0.2
g 1 degree of inflation persistence Gamma 0.7 0.14
g 2 elasticity of inflation rate with respect to real output Gamma 0.1 0.02
h 1 coefficient on output gap in the monetary policy reaction function Gamma 0.8 0.16
h 2 coefficient on inflation rate in the monetary policy reaction function Gamma 1.2 0.24
k 1 monetary policy shock persistence Gamma 0.7 0.14
σ ｙ
2 variance　of demand shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 (0.009)2
σπ 2 variance　of cost-push shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 (0.009)2
σ dd 2 variance of money demand shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 (0.009)2
σ ld 2 variance of loan supply shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 (0.009)2
σ ls 2 variance of loan demand shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 (0.009)2
σ rs 2 variance of monetary policy shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 (0.009)2
parametres
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quantity of bank loans is more constrained by the supply side for loans to SMEs, from, for example, credit rationing. 
The other noteworthy finding is that a smaller proportion of forecast error variance for Regional bank loans is explained 
by the monetary policy shock rs  whereas a larger proportion is explained by cost-push shock  . These results are 
inconsistent with Kashyap and Stein’s (1994) findings that the loans of smaller banks as well as the loans to 
bank-dependent smaller firms are more sensitive to monetary policy. 
Table 3. Estimation results 
 
Table 4. Impulse response functions of i   and l  with respect to rs  
 
 
l aa l as l ca l cs l ra l rs
0.1115 0.1542 0.1278 0.1961 0.1095 0.1470
(0.0977-0.1270) (0.1174-0.1900) (0.0977-0.1544) (0.1494-0.2408) (0.0977-0.1228) (0.1109-0.1801)
0.0222 0.0222 0.0222 0.0217 0.0216 0.0223
(0.0147-0.0302) (0.0152-0.0300) (0.0146-0.0295) (0.0145-0.0288) (0.0145-0.0286) (0.0151-0.0297)
0.0648 0.0643 0.0658 0.0655 0.0630 0.0604
(0.0451-0.0833) (0.0428-0.0885) (0.0435-0.0889) (0.0448-0.0870) (0.0452-0.0814) (0.0414-0.0788)
0.0111 0.0112 0.0113 0.0116 0.0112 0.0112
(0.0076-0.0147) (0.0076-0.0146) (0.0079-0.0150) (0.0076-0.0155) (0.0077-0.0147) (0.0076-0.0147)
0.7923 0.7838 0.9227 0.9291 0.6949 0.6857
(0.5812-1.0014) (0.5611-0.9975) (0.6684-1.1867) (0.6785-1.1884) (0.4956-0.9110) (0.4834-0.8832)
1.4075 1.4082 1.4081 1.4081 1.4078 1.4083
(1.3929-1.4184) (1.3947-1.4184) (1.3946-1.4184) (1.3950-1.4184) (1.3942-1.4184) (1.3948-1.4184)
0.8450 0.8479 0.8396 0.8402 0.8719 0.8678
(0.7881-0.9041) (0.7896-0.9055) (0.7809-0.8991) (0.7819-0.9002) (0.8146-0.9289) (0.8141-0.9238)
1.0530 1.0394 1.0372 1.0585 1.0489 1.0175
(0.7309-1.3704) (0.7111-1.3550) (0.7160-1.3527) (0.7133-1.3792) (0.7222-1.3701) (0.7120-1.3335)
2.2468 2.2485 2.2491 2.2472 2.2488 2.2510
(2.2165-2.2695) (2.2208-2.2695) (2.2228-2.2695) (2.2173-2.2695) (2.2217-2.2695) (2.2286-2.2695)
0.3069 0.3071 0.3065 0.3067 0.3074 0.3060
(0.2277-0.3857) (0.2237-0.3859) (0.2286-0.3842) (0.2286-0.3879) (0.2289-0.3846) (0.2246-0.3863)
0.0222 0.0221 0.0219 0.0218 0.0223 0.0225
(0.0195-0.0250) (0.0195-0.0249) (0.0195-0.0244) (0.0195-0.0243) (0.0195-0.0252) (0.0195-0.0254)
2.2509 2.2522 2.2524 2.2520 2.2523 2.2503
(2.2255-2.2695) (2.2301-2.2695) (2.2302-2.2695) (2.2288-2.2695) (2.2297-2.2695) (2.2260-2.2695)
1.3014 1.2874 1.2652 1.3049 1.3117 1.3000
(0.8853-1.7042) (0.8633-1.6781) (0.8336-1.6842) (0.8834-1.7185) (0.8851-1.7193) (0.8963-1.7096)
0.7168 0.7172 0.7347 0.7346 0.4573 0.4589
(0.6406-0.7915) (0.6420-0.7931) (0.6622-0.8111) (0.6588-0.8073) (0.3715-0.5435) (0.3697-0.5441)
0.0251 0.0252 0.0259 0.0259 0.0250 0.0250
(0.0229-0.0274) (0.0229-0.0274) (0.0235-0.0282) (0.0236-0.0282) (0.0229-0.0271) (0.0228-0.0272)
0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0023-0.0028) (0.0024-0.0028) (0.0023-0.0028) (0.0023-0.0028) (0.0023-0.0028) (0.0023-0.0028)
0.1878 0.1886 0.2095 0.2085 0.2114 0.2117
(0.1717-0.2038) (0.1714-0.2036) (0.1909-0.2261) (0.1910-0.2257) (0.1944-0.2291) (0.1940-0.2289)
0.0192 0.0197 0.0243 0.0245 0.0170 0.0189
(0.0175-0.0209) (0.0179-0.0215) (0.0220-0.0265) (0.0222-0.0268) (0.0155-0.0184) (0.0172-0.0206)
0.1878 0.1860 0.2130 0.2152 0.2052 0.2050
(0.1727-0.2034) (0.1713-0.2005) (0.1942-0.2309) (0.1960-0.2319) (0.1866-0.2242) (0.1876-0.2210)
0.1538 0.1534 0.1680 0.1662 0.2096 0.2089
(0.1404-0.1676) (0.1417-0.1672) (0.1543-0.1828) (0.1523-0.1792) (0.1916-0.2267) (0.1902-0.2256)
σ ls 2
σ rs 2
σ y 2
σ π 2
σ dd 2
k 1
g 1
g 2
h 1
σ ld 2
e 3
c 1
d 1
d 2
h 2
a 1
a 2
b 1
e 1
e 2
 
ρ -i l ρ -i l ρ -i l ρ -i l ρ -i l ρ -i l
1 -0.0658 0.0094 -0.0609 0.0113 -0.0768 0.0109 -0.0686 0.0144 -0.0824 0.0126 -0.0747 0.0149
2 -0.0263 0.0081 -0.0227 0.0094 -0.0331 0.0095 -0.0285 0.0120 -0.0067 0.0076 -0.0031 0.0083
3 -0.0184 0.0078 -0.0157 0.0086 -0.0235 0.0090 -0.0203 0.0106 -0.0021 0.0061 -0.0006 0.0061
4 -0.0129 0.0075 -0.0109 0.0080 -0.0167 0.0086 -0.0147 0.0097 -0.0004 0.0055 0.0002 0.0051
5 -0.0089 0.0073 -0.0075 0.0076 -0.0118 0.0084 -0.0105 0.0090 0.0004 0.0052 0.0006 0.0047
6 -0.0060 0.0072 -0.0050 0.0073 -0.0082 0.0082 -0.0074 0.0085 0.0008 0.0050 0.0008 0.0045
7 -0.0039 0.0070 -0.0032 0.0071 -0.0055 0.0081 -0.0051 0.0081 0.0010 0.0049 0.0009 0.0044
8 -0.0024 0.0069 -0.0019 0.0069 -0.0035 0.0079 -0.0034 0.0078 0.0011 0.0048 0.0009 0.0043
9 -0.0013 0.0068 -0.0010 0.0067 -0.0020 0.0078 -0.0021 0.0075 0.0011 0.0048 0.0009 0.0042
10 -0.0004 0.0067 -0.0003 0.0065 -0.0009 0.0077 -0.0011 0.0073 0.0011 0.0047 0.0009 0.0041
11 0.0002 0.0066 0.0002 0.0064 -0.0001 0.0076 -0.0004 0.0071 0.0011 0.0046 0.0009 0.0041
12 0.0006 0.0065 0.0006 0.0063 0.0005 0.0075 0.0002 0.0070 0.0011 0.0046 0.0009 0.0040
13 0.0009 0.0064 0.0008 0.0062 0.0009 0.0073 0.0006 0.0068 0.0011 0.0045 0.0009 0.0040
14 0.0011 0.0063 0.0010 0.0061 0.0013 0.0072 0.0009 0.0067 0.0011 0.0044 0.0009 0.0039
15 0.0013 0.0063 0.0012 0.0060 0.0015 0.0071 0.0011 0.0066 0.0011 0.0044 0.0009 0.0039
16 0.0014 0.0062 0.0013 0.0059 0.0017 0.0071 0.0013 0.0065 0.0010 0.0043 0.0009 0.0038
17 0.0015 0.0061 0.0013 0.0058 0.0018 0.0070 0.0014 0.0064 0.0010 0.0043 0.0008 0.0038
18 0.0016 0.0060 0.0014 0.0058 0.0019 0.0069 0.0015 0.0063 0.0010 0.0042 0.0008 0.0037
19 0.0016 0.0059 0.0014 0.0057 0.0020 0.0068 0.0016 0.0062 0.0010 0.0041 0.0008 0.0037
20 0.0016 0.0058 0.0014 0.0056 0.0020 0.0067 0.0016 0.0061 0.0010 0.0041 0.0008 0.0036
21 0.0016 0.0058 0.0014 0.0055 0.0020 0.0066 0.0016 0.0061 0.0010 0.0040 0.0008 0.0036
22 0.0016 0.0057 0.0014 0.0055 0.0020 0.0065 0.0017 0.0060 0.0010 0.0040 0.0008 0.0035
23 0.0016 0.0056 0.0014 0.0054 0.0020 0.0064 0.0017 0.0059 0.0010 0.0039 0.0008 0.0035
24 0.0016 0.0055 0.0014 0.0053 0.0020 0.0063 0.0017 0.0058 0.0009 0.0039 0.0008 0.0034
l aa l as l ca l cs l ra l rs
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 3, No. 1; 2016 
32 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Impulse response functions: aal (all banks’ loans to all enterprises)  
 
 
Figure 1-2. Impulse response functions: asl (all banks’ loans to SMEs) 
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Figure 1-3. Impulse response functions: cal (City banks’ loans to all enterprises)  
 
 
Figure 1-4. Impulse response functions: csl (City banks’ loans to SMEs) 
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Figure 1-5. Impulse response functions: ral (Regional banks’ loans to all enterprises)  
 
 
Figure 1-6. Impulse response functions: rsl (Regional banks’ loans to SMEs) 
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Table 5. Variance Decompositions 
 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we investigate empirically whether the bank lending channel operated in Japan. We focus on the 
differential effects of quantitative easing monetary policy regardless of bank and firm size. We extend Bernanke and 
Blinder’s (1988) model to endogenize the price level (inflation rate) and estimate it using the Bayesian estimation 
method.  
Our estimation results show that with respect to bank lending rate, the semi-elasticities of loan supply are larger than 
those of loan demand. This means that the loan supply curve is flatter in the l   plane; thus, following an increase in 
loan supply (the loan supply curve shifts to the right), a larger decline in bank lending rate is required to stimulate loan 
demand. We also find that with respect to bank lending rate, the semi-elasticities of both loan demand and loan supplies 
are almost the same regardless of bank and enterprise size. 
Our Bayesian impulse response function analyses show that following a quantitative easing monetary policy shock, the 
lending of banks increases whereas the spread declines, which is evidence of the bank lending channel. Moreover, the 
spreads decline more largely, while loans increase more slightly for loans to all enterprises. This means that a 
quantitative easing monetary policy shock stimulates the loan demand of SMEs in larger magnitude. 
From our variance decomposition analyses, we find that while a large proportion of forecast error variance in bank 
loans is explained by monetary policy shock, a large proportion of forecast error variance in the spread is explained by 
loan supply shock. These results are also evidence of the bank lending channel.  
However, we find no obvious evidence that the loans of smaller banks and loans to smaller firms are more sensitive to 
monetary policy. Especially, a smaller proportion of forecast error variance for loans of Regional banks is explained by 
monetary policy shock and a larger proportion of forecast error variance of loans to SMEs is explained by the loan 
 
ε y ε π ε dd ε ld ε ls ε rs
y 0.00 0.69 0.04 0.39 39.72 59.15
π 0.00 44.87 0.02 0.16 16.59 38.36
ρ -i 0.09 0.05 29.95 0.63 64.24 5.05
l 0.00 16.25 0.03 10.44 9.92 63.36
ε y ε π ε dd ε ld ε ls ε rs
y 0.00 0.71 0.04 0.43 40.14 58.67
π 0.00 46.98 0.02 0.17 16.21 36.62
ρ -i 0.09 0.04 30.48 0.69 64.08 4.61
l 0.00 15.43 0.02 10.66 12.26 61.63
ε y ε π ε dd ε ld ε ls ε rs
y 0.00 0.56 0.05 0.51 41.67 57.21
π 0.00 40.77 0.02 0.23 18.81 40.17
ρ -i 0.07 0.05 27.78 0.81 65.54 5.76
l 0.00 12.62 0.03 13.14 11.27 62.94
ε y ε π ε dd ε ld ε ls ε rs
y 0.00 0.62 0.04 0.55 41.08 57.71
π 0.00 43.44 0.02 0.23 17.45 38.86
ρ -i 0.08 0.04 29.61 0.87 64.67 4.73
l 0.00 11.87 0.01 12.09 13.92 62.10
ε y ε π ε dd ε ld ε ls ε rs
y 0.00 0.63 0.06 0.28 42.50 56.53
π 0.00 45.93 0.03 0.13 19.68 34.23
ρ -i 0.07 0.03 33.96 0.40 60.61 4.93
l 0.00 24.26 0.08 12.41 17.66 45.59
ε y ε π ε dd ε ld ε ls ε rs
y 0.00 0.64 0.04 0.36 41.94 57.01
π 0.00 46.27 0.02 0.16 19.14 34.41
ρ -i 0.08 0.03 34.13 0.52 60.66 4.59
l 0.00 21.55 0.04 13.55 19.03 45.84
l rs
l aa
l as
l ca
l cs
l ra
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supply shock compared to that of loans to all enterprises, implying that bank loans to SMEs are more constrained by the 
supply side.  
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Notes 
Note 1. This means that bank loans and open-market bonds are not perfect substitutes and so the Modigliani-Miller 
capital structure invariance proposition does not hold.  
Note 2. See Kimura, Kobayashi, Muranaga, and Ugai (2003) for the recent developments in monetary policy in Japan. 
Note 3. Equation (2) is derived by log-linearizing the loan supply function ( ) (1 )St tL i D      , where   is the 
required reserve ratio on deposits and   denotes the fraction of the bank’s net of required.  
Note 4. The right-hand side of equation (3) is derived by log-linearizing the bank reserve demand function 
( ( ))St tRS i D   , where   denotes the fraction of reserve demand that exceeds the required reserve.   is 
decreasing in the bond rate. 
Note 5. Note that we normalize the deposit interest rate as zero. 
Note 6. See An and Schorfheide (2007) for a review of Bayesian methods for estimation of the DSGE model. 
Note 7. Trust banks are not included. 
Note 8. Strictly speaking, the semi-elasticities of loan supply are slightly larger for loans to all enterprises than for 
SMEs. 
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